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ABSTRACT. When people agree to disagree, how does the disagreement affect asset prices?
Within an equilibrium framework with two agents, two risky assets and a riskless bond, we
analyze the joint impact of disagreement about expected payoff, variance and correlation, and
compare prices with benchmark prices in a market with homogeneous beliefs.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In financial markets, it is well recognized that people agree to disagree and the disagree-
ment can have a significant impact on asset prices (see for example Fama and French (2007)).
Disagreement complicates the formulation of asset prices, which makes a complete analysis
difficult. In a static setting, when investors with the same risk tolerance agree on the covariance
matrix, several authors have shown that assets remain correctly priced and the disagreement
effect “cancels out” when beliefs about expected returns are heterogeneous but on average un-
biased (see for example Levy, Levy and Benita (2006) and Yan (2010)). The analysis becomes
much more complicated when there is a disagreement about the covariance matrix, because in-
vestors’ demands are non-linear functions of their beliefs of the covariance matrix. Recently,
Chiarella, Dieci and He (2011) show that, when asset payoffs are uncorrelated, disagreement
about variances leads to a diversification effect. However, Duchin and Levy (2010) show that
tiny fluctuations in the disagreement about the variance lead to substantial price fluctuations.
Moreover, most of the literature focuses on the price impact of a specific type of disagreement
(expected returns or variances) by assuming investors are otherwise identical, and not much
attention has been paid to their joint impact, which can be very different from their individual
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impact. For example, Jouini and Napp (2006, 2008) and Chiarella et al. (2011) find that the
impact of disagreement on prices is governed by the risk tolerance weighted average level of
pessimism/optimism.
In a market with two risky assets, agents may have different risk tolerances, and jointly
disagree about the expected payoffs, variances of payoffs and the correlation between payoffs.
We show that even when agents have the same objective belief about the expected payoff and
variance for the first asset, the market as a whole can be overoptimistic/overpessimistic and
overconfident about its payoff if agents simultaneously disagree about the expected payoff and
variance of the second asset or simultaneously disagree about the expected payoff of the second
asset and the correlation between payoffs. As a result, prices of both assets are in general
different from the benchmark prices in a market with homogeneous beliefs. This leads to a
spillover effect of disagreement in a multi-asset market. All our results are limited to a static
model. Impact of disagreement in a dynamic model can be very different. For example, Jouini
and Napp (2011) show that even when beliefs are on average unbiased and risk tolerances are
the same, disagreement can have a significant impact on the price dynamics and the risk-return
trade-off of risky assets.
This paper is organized as follows, Section 2 presents an equilibrium asset pricing model
with heterogeneous beliefs, Section 3 analyzes the impact of disagreement on asset prices and
Section 4 concludes.
2. THE MODEL
We consider a two-date economy with two risky assets, indexed by k = 1, 2, a riskless bond,
and two agents, indexed by i = 1, 2. The bond is in zero net supply and each agent is endowed
with one share of each risky asset on date zero. The future payoff of asset k is denoted by Xk
and let X = (X1, X2)T , moreover, the risk-free rate is assumed to be zero and the current price
of the bond is 1. The asset payoffs are assumed to be jointly normal and agents are assumed
to have heterogeneous beliefs about the expected payoffs and covariance matrix of the payoffs.
For agent i (i = 1, 2), let








where µi,k = Ei(Xk), σ2i,k = V ari(Xk), ρi = Correli(X1, X2) for i, k = 1, 2, and denote
Bi := (µi, Vi) the subjective belief of agent i.
2.1. Portfolio Optimization. The terminal wealth of agent i is given by Wi = zi,B + zTi X,
where zi = (zi,1, zi,2)T is the number of shares of the risky assets held by agent i, and zi,B is
the number of bonds held. Agent i maximizes a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility
function Ui(Wi) = −τi exp{−Wi/τi} of his terminal wealth Wi under his subjective belief Bi,
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subject to the budget constraint zTi p+zi,B = pT1, where τi is agent i’s risk-tolerance. When the
terminal wealth Wi is normally distributed, maximizing Ei[Ui(Wi)] is equivalent to maximizing
the certainty equivalent wealth given by zi,B + zTi µi − 12τizTi Vizi, where p = (p1, p2)T is the




i (µi − p) and z∗i,B = pT (1− z∗i ). (1)















(z1,B + z2,B). (2)
Therefore, the bond market clears as long as the asset market clears.
To characterize market equilibrium under heterogeneous beliefs, a concept of consensus be-
lief has been developed by Lintner (1969) and Rubinstein (1974, 1975). In this paper, a belief
Ba = (µa, Va) is called a market consensus belief if the equilibrium prices under the heteroge-
neous beliefs Bi := (µi, Vi) (i = 1, 2) are also the equilibrium prices under the homogeneous
belief Ba.
We construct a consensus belief similar to Chiarella et al. (2011), which allows us to analyze
the heterogeneous economy as an equivalent homogeneous economy. Let τa = 12(τ1 + τ2) be
the average risk tolerance. Applying Proposition 3.2 in Chiarella et al. (2011), the consensus


























and the equilibrium asset prices are given by
p = µa − Va1/τa. (4)





(µi − µa) + Va1/τa
]
. (5)
In the following, we use the consensus belief constructed in equation (3) to examine the impact
of disagreement among agents on the equilibrium prices (4) of risky assets.
3. THE PRICE IMPACT OF DISAGREEMENTS
To measure the price impact of disagreement, we first consider a benchmark economy in
which agents have homogeneous beliefs and the same level of risk tolerance, that is, Bi =
Bo = (µo, Vo), where Bo may be regarded as the objective belief about the distribution of asset
payoffs and τi = τ . Since there is no disagreement, the consensus belief in this case coincides
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with the objective belief, that is







and the equilibrium asset prices under homogeneous belief, or the benchmark prices, denoted
by pˆ are given by
pˆ = (µ1 − (σ21 + ρσ1σ2)/τ, µ2 − (σ22 + ρσ1σ2)/τ)T . (6)
For the economy with heterogeneous beliefs, we assume that agents agree about the expected
payoff and standard deviation of the first asset (S1), that is, (σi,1, µi,1) = (σ1, µ1) for i = 1, 2.
Furthermore, there is a disagreement about the expected payoff and standard deviation of the
second asset (S2), and also the correlation between asset payoffs. The disagreement among
agents is measured by
∆µ ≡ µ1,2 − µ2,2, ∆σ ≡ σ1,2 − σ2,2, and ∆ρ ≡ ρ1 − ρ2.
When ∆µ > (<)0, agent 1 is relatively more optimistic (pessimistic) about the payoff of S2
than agent 2; when ∆σ > (<)0, agent 1 is relatively more doubtful (confident) about the payoff
of S2 than agent 2; when ∆ρ > (<)0, agent 1 perceives a higher (lower) correlation between
asset payoffs than agent 2. Moreover, assume the average risk tolerance is given by τa = τ , the
difference in risk tolerance is measured by ∆τ ≡ τ1 − τ2. Hence, when ∆τ > (<)0, agent 1 is
more (less) risk tolerant than agent 2. Following (4), the equilibrium prices are then determined
by the consensus belief,
p = (µa,1 − (σ2a,1 + ρaσa,1σa,2)/τ, µa,2 − (σ2a,2 + ρaσa,1σa,2)/τ)T .
If consensus belief coincides with the objective belief, then p = pˆ.
To facilitate the analysis, we introduce notations of three different averages, namely the arith-
metic, geometric and harmonic averages, defined by
A(x1, x2) ≡ (x1 + x2)/2, G(x1, x2) ≡ √x1x2, H(x1, x2) ≡ [(1/x1 + 1/x2)/2]−1.
Note that, when x1 6= x2, we have H(x1, x2) < G(x1, x2) < A(x1, x2). To examine the impact
of the disagreement, we consider three cases.
Case 1. The impact of risk tolerance and optimism/pessimism—This case has been consid-
ered in the literature. For example, in a market with a single risky asset, Jouini and Napp (2007)
show that the consensus belief of the expected payoff is a risk-tolerance weighted average of
agents’ perceived expected payoffs. We show in the next proposition1 that this result also carries
over to a multi-asset market.
1Proofs of propositions only involve simple algebras, therefore are omitted from the paper.
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Proposition 1. When ∆σ = ∆ρ = 0, the consensus belief is given by Va = Vo, µa =
(µ1, αµ1,2 + (1− α)µ2,2)T , where α ≡ τ1/(τ1 + τ2). The equilibrium prices are given by
p1 = pˆ1, p2 = pˆ2 + α(µ1,2 − µ2) + (1− α)(µ2,2 − µ2).
Proposition 1 shows that S1 is always correctly priced in the sense that its price coincides
with the benchmark price of S1, which is intuitive since both agents perceive the objective
expected payoff for S1 and the objective covariance matrix. For S2, the consensus belief is a
risk-tolerance weighted average of agents’ perceived expected payoffs, which is also intuitive
since the more risk tolerant agent would buy/sell S2 more aggressively than the less risk tolerant
agent. This result is consistent with Jouini and Napp (2006, 2007) and Chiarella et al. (2011).
Case 2. The impact of optimism/pessimism and confidence/doubt—In this case, agents have
the same risk tolerances and perceive the same expected payoff and variance for S1 and the same
correlation between asset payoffs, but disagree about the expected payoff and standard deviation
of S2.
Proposition 2. When ∆τ = 0 and ∆ρ = 0, the consensus belief Ba is given by




∆σ∆µ, µa,2 = βµ1,2 + (1− β)µ2,2, (7)
and



























φ ≡ (2− ρ2)A(σ21,2, σ22,2)− ρ2G(σ21,2, σ22,2) > 0, β ≡















≤ 1, ω ≡ 2− ρ
2
2(1− ρ2) ≥ 1.
Proposition 2 shows that disagreement can lead to a spillover effect when asset payoffs are
correlated, that is when ρ different from zero. Although agents perceive the objective expected
payoff for S1, equation (7) implies that the market (represented by the consensus belief) can
be overoptimistic/overpessimistic about S1’s payoff. For example, if ρ > (<)0, a positive
correlation between confidence and optimism about S2’s payoff, that is ∆σ∆µ < 0, can lead
to overoptimism (overpessimism) about the payoff (µa,1 > (<)µ1) of S1, which contributes
to overpricing (underpricing) of S1. Furthermore, equation (8) implies that, although agents
perceive the same correlation coefficient and the same variance for S1, the market is overcon-
fident about S1’s payoff (σ2a,1 < σ21) and perceives a lower correlation between asset payoffs
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(ρa < ρ), both of which contribute to overpricing of S1 when the correlation coefficient ρ > 0.
In summary, when asset payoffs are correlated and agents disagree about the expected payoff
and variance of S2, even though agents perceives the objective expected payoff and variance for
S1 and the objective correlation, the market can be overoptimistic/overpessimistic and overcon-
fident about S1’s payoff and also perceives a lower correlation. The spillover effect disappears
when ρ = 0, in this case, market perceives the objective expected payoff and variance for S1 and
the objective correlation, that is, µa,1 = µ1, σ2a,1 = σ21 , ρa = ρ = 0, and p1 = pˆ1 = µ1 − σ21/τ .
Equation (8) shows that the consensus belief about S2’s precision (1/σ2a,2) is a weighted
average of the arithmetic and geometric means of agents’ perceived precisions, and the weight
on the geometric mean is negative since ω > 1. When ρ = 0, we obtainω = 1 and the consensus
belief about S2’s variance becomes a harmonic mean of agents’ perceived variances of S2, that












market perceives a higher precision (hence a lower variance) for S2 compare to the case of
ρ = 0. Furthermore, equation (7) shows that the consensus belief about S2’s expected payoff
is a weighted arithmetic average of agents’ perceived expected payoffs and the weights are
determined by the objective correlation and the perceived variances for S2. When ρ = 0,
the consensus belief about S2’s expected payoff becomes a precision-weighted average of the







, which is consistent with Jouini and Napp
(2007).
Case 3: Optimism/Pessimism and disagreement in correlations—In this case, we examine
the joint impact of optimism/pessimism about S2 (measured by ∆µ) and disagreement in the
correlation coefficient (measured by ∆ρ) by assuming ∆τ = 0,∆σ = 0. To our knowledge,
this is the first paper to examine the impact of disagreement about correlation on asset prices.
Proposition 3. When ∆τ = ∆σ = 0, the consensus belief Ba is given by






, µa,2 = θµ1,2 + (1− θ)µ2,2 (9)
and
ρa = ωρρ1 + (1− ωρ)ρ2, σ2a,1 = γ1σ21 , σ2a,2 = γ2σ22, (10)
where











, γ1 = γ2 =
1−A(ρ21, ρ22)
1− A(ρ1, ρ2)2 < 1.
In Proposition 3, equation (9) shows that even though agents perceive the same expected
payoff for S1, the market is overpessimistic (overoptimistic) about the S1’s payoff when there is
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a positive (negative) correlation between optimism and perceived correlations, that is ∆ρ∆µ >
(<)0, which contributes to underpricing (overpricing) of S1. Furthermore, the consensus belief
about S2’s payoff µa,2 is a weighted average of agents perceived expected payoffs, weights are
determined by agents’ perceived correlations. When the arithmetic average of the perceived
correlations is zero, that is A(ρ1, ρ2) = 0, we obtain θ = 12 and µa,2 = A(µ1, µ2).
Moreover, equation (10) shows that even though agents perceive the same variances for the
payoffs of both assets, market is overconfident about the asset payoffs, which contributes to the
overpricing of assets when2 σa,1 > −ρaσa,2 and σa,2 > −ρaσa,1. The consensus belief about the
correlation is a weighted average of agents’ perceived correlations and the weights are biased
towards the agent who perceives a higher absolute correlation, |ρi|. When A(ρ1, ρ2) = 0, agents
perceive the same absolute correlation (|ρ1| = |ρ2|) and market perceives the average perceived
correlation, that is ρa = A(ρ1, ρ2) = 0.
4. CONCLUSION
In a market with two risky assets and a riskless bond, we show that disagreement about the
expected payoff and variance of one asset, together with disagreement about the correlation
coefficient, can jointly affect the consensus belief about the payoffs of both assets, leading to
a spillover effect. Prices determined by the consensus belief are in general different from the
benchmark prices in a market with homogeneous beliefs. However, our results are limited to
the static model and an extension to a dynamic model would be interesting, which we leave to
future research.
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